REPLY
Richard A. Watson

1) In the first sen tence of his reply, Taylor says
he will clarify ''what it means to make value judgments from a non-conscious organism's standpoint (or what it means to take that standpoint in
making such judgments) ." Taylor characteristically conflates these two very different things in
an apparent attempt to convince the reader that
in saying something about the one he has said
something about the other. But in his comment,
Taylor does not clarify "what it means to make
value judgments from a non-conscious
organism's standpoint." He merely reiterates the
objective sense of "taking a standpoint" based on
knowing what would hinder or help an organism
to survive. Throughout my review I agree that
this is possible. Where Taylor and I disagree is
that he thinks that objective knowledge about
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self-conscious interests. I hold that a universe
without self-conscious entities would have no
worth or value. I believe that deviations from this
relational interpretation of worth and value as
deriving from self-conscious individual interests
leads to the dangerous mistake of thinking that
such entities as corporations, states, and the "Life
Community" have rights and responsibilities.
7) I acknowledge Taylor's protest that he does
not hate the human race. But if Taylor agrees
that on the disappearance of Homo sapiens there
would remain no self-conscious individuals who
could think and say "Good riddance!", then what
is the rhetorical force of his little story if not that
of genocidal misanthropy? Or is it just black
humor? If so, as a member of the race that is the
butt of the joke, I protest.

the survival conditions of an organism is enough
to allow us to make value judgments from its
"standpoint," but I think that value judgments
can be made only by and for entities that have
self-conscious standpoints.
2) I mean by "moral subject" anything subject
to characterization with moral terminology,
which does not mean that it must have a· subjective standpoint. I am bemused by Taylor's
explanation that the possible medical implications of "moral patient" would be more confusing than the considerable subjectival
implications of "moral subject." Taylor's text
without the ambiguities of "moral subject" would
be less persuasive than it now is.
3) Why should we "regard a living thing (conscious or non-conscious) as having inheren t
worth"? By saying that Cahen gives an analysis of
how non-conscious organisms "can be correctly
said to be goal-oriented" (my italics), Taylor
implies that he has made his point that teleological centers of life have inherent worth. But
all Cahen demonstrates about goal-oriented
organisms is the objective position Taylor reiterates in his point 1 and that I agree with. Taylor,
like many environmental ethicists, assumes the
inherent worth of life and works out the implications of that assumption, but fails to show how
the assumption can be supported by anything
more than intuition.
4) On this point I refer the reader to my
review. Beyond that, objective facts are coherent
with any moral outlook and thus coherence with
facts per se is not a criterion that distinguishes any
one moral outlook from any other. The objective
fact that the survival of a living organism can be
hindered or helped by our actions is just as
coherent with the anthropocentric as with the
biocentric outlook. Taylor packs a biocentric
moral agenda into the phrase "rational justification." But if you take "rational" in a morally
neutral sense, then you can find coherent factvalue combinations to 'Justify" anything.
5) Again, I refer the reader to my review.
Which of us is not engaging the other?
6) The substantive point on which Taylor and I
disagree is that he contends that worth and value
are sometimes intrinsic, while I argue that they
are always extrinsic and arise only in relation to
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